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* 
An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best 
read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the 
Articles of Confederation.  The work of these “collective action theorists” is 
reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.  Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collective-
action impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds. 
In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence 
of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both 
necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the 
Commerce Clause.  Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce 
power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct 
substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate.  Unlike federalist 
defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does 
not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or 
between regulating and requiring commerce. 
Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is 
sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree 
that it is necessary.  By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action 
problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will 
disagree that it is sufficient. 
This Essay anticipates such criticism.  Regarding the nationalist critique of 
a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects” 
test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.  I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action 
problems too narrowly.  In addition to races to the bottom, collective action 
problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom. 
Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to 
include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every 
subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a 
collective action problem.  Federalists may further object that the Commerce 
Clause is limited to “Commerce.”  In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best 
understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as 
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Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged.  I also argue that a 
collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power.  
Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities 
that justify use of the Commerce Clause. 
Introduction 
In the 1780s, the young nation faced serious problems, and the Articles 
of Confederation prevented it from addressing them effectively.  Most 
significantly, the states made a habit of discriminating against commerce 
from other states and refusing to contribute their fair share of money and 
troops to the national treasury and military.
1
  The nation could not solve these 
problems for three primary reasons: they transcended the boundaries of any 
one state; the states faced substantial impediments to collective action; and 
the federal government lacked constitutional authority to act effectively when 
the states were unable to act collectively.
2
 
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 responded to these failures of 
governance.  Echoing Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan, the Convention 
instructed the midsummer Committee of Detail that Congress would be 
empowered to legislate in, among other things, “those Cases to which the 
States are separately incompetent.”3  The Committee of Detail “changed the 
indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration . . . closely 
resembling Article I, Section 8” as adopted,4 including its authorizations of 
federal power to regulate interstate commerce, tax, and raise and support a 
military.
5
 
An increasing number of legal scholars have drawn from this history in 
offering structural accounts of the scope of the Commerce Clause.  
Specifically, “collective action theorists,” as I shall call these scholars, have 
argued that the commerce power is best read in light of the collective action 
problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation, when 
Congress lacked the power to regulate interstate commerce.  Included in their 
 
1. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (cataloguing the problems with 
the Articles of Confederation); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 44–
46, 106–08 (2005) (same); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23 
(1999) (same). 
2. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121–24 (2010) (using the logic of collective action to 
explain the failures of the Articles of Confederation). 
3. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966). 
4. Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1340 (1934). 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 11–16. 
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ranks are Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Robert Cooter, Andy Koppelman, 
Donald Regan, and myself.
6
 
The work of these collective action theorists appears to be reflected in 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (NFIB).
7
  In one of the most important opinions of her tenure, 
Ginsburg stressed the “collective-action impasse”8 at the state level to which 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
9
 responds.  Ginsburg 
insisted that “States cannot resolve the problem of the uninsured on their 
own,”10 and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined this part of her 
opinion.
11
 
This is a significant, if underappreciated, development.  Ginsburg did 
not argue merely that Congress could have rationally concluded that the 
conduct of the uninsured, as a general class, substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  In addition, she argued that the scope and nature of the problem 
rendered the federal government better situated than the states to solve it.
12
  
To be sure, Ginsburg did not reject the substantial effects test in favor of an 
alternative that would make the existence or nonexistence of a multistate 
collective problem dispositive of the Commerce Clause inquiry.
13
  But she 
did place special emphasis on the collective action problems that the ACA’s 
 
6. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 107–08; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2010); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 115–16; Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the 
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 
554–57 (1995); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the 
Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 30 (2012); see also ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 
42–43, 71, 155 n.7 (2013) (drawing from works by collective action theorists in arguing that the 
ACA’s minimum coverage provision is valid Commerce Clause legislation). 
7. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
8. Id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress’[s] intervention was needed to over-
come this collective-action impasse.”). 
9. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 
25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
11. Id. at 2609. 
12. See id. Justice Ginsburg explained why states expose themselves to economic risk by pass-
ing health care reforms on their own: 
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus risk “placing themselves in 
a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors.” 
[Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).]  See also Brief for Health Care for All, 
Inc., et al. as [Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the Minimum 
Coverage Provision Issue at 4, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398)] (“[O]ut-of-state residents continue to seek and receive 
millions of dollars in uncompensated care in Massachusetts hospitals, limiting the 
State’s efforts to improve its health care system through the elimination of 
uncompensated care.”).  Facing that risk, individual States are unlikely to take the 
initiative in addressing the problem of the uninsured. 
Id. at 2612. 
13. See id. at 2616. 
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minimum coverage provision can reasonably be understood to ameliorate
14—
both alone and in combination with the ACA provisions that prohibit 
insurance companies from denying people coverage based on preexisting 
conditions, canceling coverage absent fraud, charging higher premiums 
based on medical history, and imposing lifetime limits on benefits.
15
 
Ginsburg’s opinion suggests that four Justices deem the logic of 
collective action constitutionally pertinent to the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power.  Depending on changes in the Court’s composition in the 
years ahead, this plurality may become a majority.  Accordingly, it is 
especially important at this time to understand and critically evaluate the 
work of collective action theorists. 
In its purest form, a collective action approach to the Commerce Clause 
maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action 
facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to 
address the problem by relying on the commerce power.  In the context of 
judicial review, a collective action approach asks whether Congress had a 
rational, or a reasonable, or some other more demanding basis to conclude 
that such a collective action problem exists.
16
  A collective action approach 
focuses on the distinction between problems whose solutions require 
individual (that is, separate) action by states, and problems whose solutions 
require collective action by states. 
Unlike nationalist defenders of robust federal commerce power 
(nationalists), a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated 
subject matter substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate.
17
  
Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power (federalists), 
a collective action approach does not focus on the formal distinction between 
economic and noneconomic conduct, or on the formal distinction between 
regulating and requiring commerce.
18
  Accordingly, nationalists may be 
willing to agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to 
invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary.  By 
 
14. Id. at 2613–14.  The ACA requires, among many other things, that most lawful permanent 
residents of the United States either maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage (the 
minimum-coverage provision) or else pay a certain amount of money each year (the shared-
responsibility payment).  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ch. 48, 124 Stat. at 244–50. 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-5, 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (Supp. V 2012). 
16. The question of what the Commerce Clause means is separate from the question of how 
deferential courts should be in deciding whether Congress has acted consistently with its meaning.  
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 11, 20 
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (distinguishing “the question of what the Constitution 
means and how to be faithful to it” from the question of “how a person in a particular institutional 
setting—like an unelected judge with life tenure—should interpret the Constitution and implement 
it through doctrinal constructions and applications”). 
17. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591, 601 (2011) (describing the nationalist position). 
18. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insur-
ance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 604–05 (2010) (endorsing both 
formal distinctions identified in the text). 
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contrast, federalists may be willing to agree that a collective action problem 
is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will 
disagree that it is sufficient.
19
 
I anticipate such criticism by nationalists and federalists alike in this 
Essay, which is part of a larger effort to provide a structural theory of the 
expanse and limits of congressional power and state power in Article I, 
Section 8 and certain other parts of the Constitution.
20
  Regarding the 
nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the primary 
nationalist alternative—the substantial effects test as applied for decades 
before the Court’s 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez21—imposes no 
judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause.  No 
member of the late Rehnquist or early Roberts Courts has been prepared to 
embrace this implication, and contemporary American constitutional culture 
appears to reject it.  I also argue that nationalists may define a multistate 
collective action problem too narrowly, which may cause them to conclude 
that a collective action approach would excessively limit the scope of the 
commerce power. 
By a “collective action problem,” collective action theorists typically 
mean a situation in which individually rational action by states leads to 
collectively irrational results.
22
  This could arise with a race to the bottom (or 
top) among the states.  In such a situation, states share the same basic 
objective but have incentives to act in ways that make it difficult to achieve 
the objective.
23
  Collective action problems, however, are not limited to races 
among the states.  A collective action problem may also arise in cases of 
interstate spillovers that do not involve races among the states.
24
  When states 
impose external costs on sister states, a solution to the problem will require 
collective action by the affected states, which they often will not be able to 
accomplish on their own.
25
 
Broadening the definition of a multistate collective action problem to 
include interstate externalities invites the federalist objection that every 
subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as 
requiring collective action by the states.  (This is not the only federalist 
 
19. It is, of course, oversimplified to divide the universe of constitutional interpreters into 
“nationalists,” “federalists,” and “collective action theorists.”  Many constitutional interpreters do 
not fall cleanly into one category or another.  Nonetheless, these stylized categories reflect reality at 
least roughly, and they render the analysis that follows analytically more tractable. 
20. I call this theory “the Collective Action Constitution.”  For relevant writing, see generally 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2; Siegel, supra note 6; and Siegel, supra note 17.  For additional work 
I have done on this subject, see my articles cited infra notes 75, 124, 133, and 155. 
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
22. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 117. 
23. Siegel, supra note 6, at 46. 
24. See id. at 46–47 (discussing spillovers such as pollution across state lines and the cross-state 
economic effects of racial discrimination). 
25. See id. (arguing that collective action may be required in cases of pollution and racial 
discrimination). 
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objection; another, which I will address, is that the Commerce Clause 
contains the word “Commerce.”)  If every problem Congress might want to 
address can reasonably be portrayed as a collective action problem, then a 
collective action approach—like the pre-1995 substantial effects test—
imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause. 
A collective action approach, however, need not justify unlimited 
federal commerce power.  In the context of judicial review, resources are 
available to limit the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the 
Commerce Clause.  As I argue below, courts should deem psychological 
externalities inadmissible in commerce power cases.  When Congress uses 
the Commerce Clause—unlike when it uses the spending power—it need not 
be willing to pay to vindicate the psychological concerns of people in one 
state about the well-being of people in other states.  Moreover, judicial 
review should turn not just on the existence of an interstate externality, but 
also on its significance and on the extent to which the federal law at issue 
meaningfully addresses it.  Finally, courts should impose a reasonableness 
inquiry in the context of judicial review, in contrast to genuine rational basis 
review. 
So implemented, a collective action approach offers a multigenerational 
synthesis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 
1937 through the end of the Rehnquist Court, justifying federal commerce 
power that is very broad but not limitless.  For example, the approach 
reconciles the validations of Commerce Clause authority in Wickard v. 
Filburn
26
 and Gonzales v. Raich
27
 with the invalidations of Commerce 
Clause authority in Lopez and United States v. Morrison.
28
  Moreover, the 
rejection of Commerce Clause authority for the minimum coverage provision 
by five Justices in NFIB, while warranting criticism from a collective action 
perspective, is ultimately reconcilable with the post-New Deal synthesis. 
Part I addresses the nationalist critique of a collective action approach to 
the Commerce Clause—namely, that it excessively limits federal power.  
Part II addresses two primary objections of federalists—namely, that any 
approach to the Commerce Clause must attribute meaning to the word 
“Commerce,” and that a collective action approach justifies unlimited federal 
commerce power.  A brief Conclusion summarizes the argument. 
I. The Nationalist Critique 
Nationalists are likely to view a collective action approach as working 
much better as a principle of inclusion than as a principle of exclusion.  As 
Professor Michael Dorf has conveyed, “It’s hard to conceive of a genuine 
collective action problem for the States that wouldn’t give rise to regulatory 
 
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
27. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
28. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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authority for Congress under the Commerce Clause.”29  At the same time, 
Professor Dorf has resisted my past characterizations
30
 of Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States
31
 and Katzenbach v. McClung
32
 as collective 
action cases:  
The Southern states were not trying to mandate civil rights but 
couldn’t because of a race to the bottom or spillover effects; quite the 
contrary.  The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a matter of the dominant 
national opinion on civil rights simply displacing dissenting regional 
and state opinion on the matter.  It’s possible to spin the cases as 
addressing collective action problems (as you do), but to my mind 
doing so robs the notion of a collective action problem among the 
States of its explanatory force.
33
 
For Professor Dorf it is preferable “simply to say, as the Court more or less 
said in these cases, that the Commerce Clause reaches instances of activity 
(or inactivity) having substantial effects on interstate markets, whether or not 
national regulation of such activities (or inactivities) is needed to solve a 
collective action problem.”34 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has voiced similar concerns.  He has 
distinguished between the argument that a collective action problem is 
sufficient to rely on the Commerce Clause and the argument that such a 
problem is necessary.  He deems the former claim an “insight [that] is 
tremendously valuable.”35  He is “very skeptical” about the latter claim.36  He 
prefers the substantial effects test and deems a collective action analysis 
unnecessary when the substantial effects test is satisfied.
37
  Judging from 
exchanges with other defenders of robust federal power, the reactions of 
Professor Dorf and Dean Chemerinsky are typical. 
Two responses to the nationalist critique seem appropriate.  First, the 
preferred alternative among nationalists—the substantial effects test 38  as 
applied before Lopez—imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the 
Commerce Clause.  The pre-Lopez version of the substantial effects test 
 
29. E-mail from Michael C. Dorf, Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Univ. Law Sch., 
to author (May 21, 2011, 9:23 AM) (on file with author). 
30. Siegel, supra note 6, at 46–47. 
31. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
32. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
33. Dorf, supra note 29 (emphasis omitted). 
34. Id. 
35. E-mail from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., 
Irvine Sch. of Law, to author (Aug. 2, 2011, 10:49 PM) (on file with author). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. (arguing that the substantial effects test is satisfied by the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision and questioning the necessity or utility of further justifying the provision using a 
collective action analysis). 
38. The court often dropped the “substantiality” requirement.  See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (“The Commerce Clause reaches . . . .  those activities affecting 
commerce.”). 
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asked whether Congress rationally could have concluded that the regulated 
conduct—whether economic or noneconomic in nature—affects interstate 
commerce in the aggregate.
39
  No possible or actual federal law would fail 
this test, even if one includes a “substantiality” requirement. 
In Lopez, for example, Justice Breyer was most persuasive in showing 
how Congress reasonably could have concluded that the possession of guns 
in school zones, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
40
  
If one extends the time horizon, there is a demonstrable relationship between 
school violence and student academic performance, and between student 
academic performance and national economic performance.
41
  Justice Breyer 
was so persuasive that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, did 
not try to rebut these effects.  Instead, he changed the subject, pausing to 
consider the implication of Justice Breyer’s argument, which was that the 
Commerce Clause was unlimited.
42
 
By contrast, Justice Breyer was least persuasive in explaining how his 
analysis was compatible with judicially enforceable limits on the commerce 
power.
43
  Like Solicitor General Drew Days at oral argument,
44
 Justice 
Breyer was unable or unwilling to name a single potential federal law that 
would be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause if the Gun Free School 
Zones Act were upheld.
45
  It is hard to think of conduct that, taken 
cumulatively, does not substantially affect interstate commerce. 
Nationalists may view this aspect of the substantial effects test as a 
virtue, not a vulnerability.  Instead of advocating judicially enforceable limits 
on the Commerce Clause, they tend to stress the political safeguards of 
federalism.
46
  Nationalists are right to stress them.  Political constraints, not 
 
39. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981) (“A court may invalidate legisla-
tion enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a 
congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no 
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”). 
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618–24 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing 
the effect of guns in and around schools on education and commerce). 
41. Id. 
42. See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion) (stating that under the Government’s position, “we are 
hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate”). 
43. See id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “special way in which guns and 
education are incompatible” and the impact of education on economic well-being made Lopez the 
“rare case” where noncommercial conduct has “so significant an impact upon commerce” that it is 
regulable under the Commerce Clause). 
44. For a discussion of the Solicitor General’s performance at oral argument in Lopez, see 
Siegel, supra note 17, at 591, 593–94. 
45. Justice Breyer’s performance is the more revealing of the two.  Unlike the Solicitor Gen-
eral, a Justice has no institutional responsibility to defend the constitutionality of almost all federal 
laws. 
46. The seminal article is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle 
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954), in which Professor Wechsler suggests that “the national political process in the United 
States . . . is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the 
domain of the states.”  Id. at 558; see also, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
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judicially enforceable limits, explain why no Justice worries about much of 
what the Court’s longstanding doctrine allows, including a minimum wage of 
$1,000 an hour and a prohibition on buying unhealthy foods.  To be sure, one 
might draw a different lesson from such examples—namely, that the political 
process tends to protect against congressional actions that will be unpopular 
with large segments of the American public, not that the political process 
protects federalism.  But by protecting against such federal laws, the political 
process does help to protect federalism, at least to some extent—even if this 
protection is not attributable to the role of the states in the national political 
process, and even if Congress is not otherwise motivated to protect 
federalism. 
Regardless, no Justice appointed over the past three decades has 
accepted that the political safeguards of federalism are the only safeguards 
available.  To reiterate, Justice Breyer devoted great energy to denying this 
implication of his position in Lopez.
47
  Every present Justice appears to 
believe in a national government of limited, enumerated powers, and none 
insists that the federal judiciary has no role in preserving these limits.
48
 
I do not know why every current Justice seems to reject the 
nonjusticiability approach of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.
49
  I have an intuition, however, after observing and participating in 
the fight over health care reform over the past few years.  No one involved in 
the debate thought it persuasive to argue that the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision is within the scope of the Commerce Clause just because any 
possible federal law is within the scope of the commerce power as far as 
judicial review is concerned.  No one thought it unimportant to have an 
answer to the “Lopez question.”  Perhaps this is just a function of having a 
Court with a federalist majority, but I am not so sure.  Given the extent to 
which hypotheticals involving congressional mandates to buy broccoli or 
American cars resonated in the public imagination,
50
 it may not be tenable in 
 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (1980) (arguing that “state interests are forcefully represented in 
the national political process”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (arguing that American federalism 
has been protected not by “the formal constitutional structures highlighted in Wechsler’s original 
analysis,” but “by a complex system of informal political institutions (of which political parties 
have historically been the most important)—institutions that were not part of the original design, but 
have nevertheless served to fulfill its objectives”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to 
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 360 (noting that 
the judicial focus in vindicating federalism is now “on the nature of the political process responsible 
for making the federalism-related decisions”). 
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 624–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that his position would not 
“expand the scope” of the Commerce Clause). 
48. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (unanimous opinion) (stating 
that “action that exceeds the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign 
interests of States” and that such “unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury”). 
49. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
50. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-a-symbol-in-
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contemporary American constitutional culture to advocate abandoning all 
judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause.  A collective action 
approach identifies a functional limit on federal commerce power, one that 
seeks to authorize and limit the federal government to regulate what it 
regulates best.
51
 
A second response to the nationalist critique is warranted.  Nationalists 
may entertain too restricted an understanding of what qualifies as a collective 
action problem involving multiple states.  No doubt such problems include 
races to the bottom (or top) among the states, such as the historic problems of 
“unfair competition” caused by the absence of laws in certain states banning 
child labor or requiring minimum wages and maximum hours.
52
  In a race to 
the bottom, all (or most) of the states share the same objective (such as 
national defense or a national free market), but they must overcome a 
collective action problem in order to achieve the objective.
53
  A collective 
action approach plainly justifies use of the Commerce Clause to target such 
problems. 
But a collective action rationale is not limited to races among the states.  
Collective action problems also include situations in which states pursue 
different objectives in ways that cause significant spillover effects in other 
states.  Heart of Atlanta and McClung were such cases.  Of course the 
Southern states were interested in promoting racial discrimination, not 
discouraging it.  But the collective action problem caused by racial 
discrimination was not the fact that Southern states wanted to abandon 
discrimination but were unable to do so individually.  Rather, the collective 
action problem lay in the fact that Southern states, by practicing racial 
discrimination, created a significant burden on commerce with those states 
that did not practice racial discrimination.
54
  In other words, Professor Dorf 
focuses on the wrong states in the quotation above.
55
  Southern states were 
not impeded from combating racial discrimination because of the conduct of 
non-Southern states.  On the contrary, racial discrimination by Southern 
states imposed negative externalities on non-Southern states. 
 
the-health-care-debate.html (discussing the use of hypotheticals involving broccoli and American 
cars in public discourse over health care reform). 
51. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2 (developing the theory of collective action 
federalism). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 160–62 (discussing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). 
53. If unanimity were required, then there would typically be insuperable impediments to 
collective action by the states.  For example, a distinct minority of states (or just Rhode Island) 
would have defeated any effort to abandon the Articles of Confederation in favor of a more 
powerful central government.  See U.S. CONST. art. VII (providing that ratification of the 
Constitution by nine out of thirteen states would suffice). 
54. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 37 (“Businesses in states that do not permit discrimination 
may alter their employment and production policies in order to cater to consumers and clients in 
jurisdictions that permit (or even expect) discrimination.”). 
55. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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In promoting an apartheid social order, Southern states made it 
substantially more difficult for African-Americans and other racial minorities 
to travel interstate for purposes of business, education, and tourism.  The 
State of California so argued in its amicus brief in Heart of Atlanta: 
California industry is a prime recipient of government contracts, 
which can necessitate travel to the nation’s capital or defense 
installations in other states.  Californians serve in the armed forces of 
our nation, which frequently requires them to travel through and reside 
in sister states during their period of service.  Citizens of California, in 
the course of their business and employment, must utilize places of 
public accommodation throughout the United States. 
  Of no less significance to our national well-being is interstate 
travel for educational and recreational purposes, including visitation of 
our great national shrines located in other states.
56
 
The Green Book, which helped African-Americans to find accommodations 
while on the road in the Jim Crow South, has come to symbolize the 
impediments to interstate travel that Southern states imposed.
57
 
Moreover, Jim Crow practices in the South led to the Great Migration of 
African-Americans to Northern cities, with all of the social problems 
associated with an influx of cheap labor.
58
  “Immigration from discriminating 
states will put pressure on housing, wages, and working conditions in more 
egalitarian states, especially if the new immigrants are used to working at 
lower wages and under inferior working conditions.” 59   These external 
effects of Southern racism were demonstrable, not merely plausible or 
hypothetical.  Internalization of these interstate externalities required 
collective action by the states, which only Congress could provide. 
Accordingly, a collective action approach to the Commerce Clause 
justifies federal commerce power over discrimination affecting interstate 
commerce.  And the problem of discrimination affecting commerce 
illustrates a more general point.  Properly understood, a collective action 
approach authorizes substantially broader federal commerce power than 
nationalists may presuppose. 
To be sure, a collective action defense of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
does not adequately reflect our moral and constitutional intuitions about why 
the federal government may dismantle a regime of public and private racial 
discrimination.  Of course our primary objection to racial discrimination, like 
our main objection to sex discrimination, sounds not in interference with 
commerce, but in human equality and liberty.  But underscoring the equality 
 
56. Brief of the State of California as Amicus Curiae at 5–6, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964 WL 81384, at *5–6 (footnotes omitted). 
57. See, e.g., Celia McGee, The Open Road Wasn’t Quite Open to All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/books/23green.html. 
58. Balkin, supra note 6, at 37. 
59. Id. 
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and liberty values compromised by various forms of discrimination is just a 
way of suggesting (without demonstrating) that the Court has erred in 
disabling Congress from ever regulating private conduct under Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
60
  It is just a way of suggesting, for example, 
that United States v. Morrison should have been an easy win for the federal 
government under Section Five.
61
  The structural logic of the enforcement 
clauses of the Civil War Amendments
62
 does not commend inquiry into the 
existence or nonexistence of multistate collective action problems.
63
  On the 
contrary, the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments give 
Congress authority to regulate the internal policy choices of state 
governments concerning certain subject matters regardless of collective 
action problems facing the states.
64
  From a structural perspective, such 
federal power is central to the meaning of the Civil War and the purposes of 
Reconstruction. 
Of course, stressing how discrimination diminishes equality and liberty 
is not an argument in favor of the pre-Lopez substantial effects test in 
Commerce Clause litigation.  The substantial effects test is equally oblivious 
to the profound interest people have in being free from various forms of 
discrimination, public and private. 
II. The Federalist Critique 
Reassuring nationalists that a collective action approach would not 
severely limit the commerce power may encourage federalists to scream 
“gotcha!” for at least two reasons.  First, federalists may observe that 
 
60. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 61927 (2000) (prohibiting Congress from 
using its Section Five power to regulate private action); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 46 
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The assumption that [the Fourteenth Amendment] consists wholly 
of prohibitions upon State laws and State proceedings in hostility to its provisions[] is unauthorized 
by its language.  The first clause . . . is of a distinctly affirmative character.”).  Justice Harlan wrote 
that “[t]he citizenship thus acquired” by African-Americans, “in virtue of an affirmative grant from 
the nation, may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the government, but by 
congressional legislation of a primary direct character.”  Id.  This was “because the power of 
Congress is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action.  It is, in 
terms distinct and positive, to enforce . . . all of the provisions—affirmative and prohibitive, of the 
[A]mendment.”  Id. 
61. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–27 (holding that § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, which provided a private civil damages remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, was 
beyond the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
63. This observation, however, hardly suffices to refute the “state action” requirement imposed 
on Section Five legislation by the Civil Rights Cases and Morrison.  One way to demonstrate the 
impropriety of this requirement is to follow Justice Harlan’s lead, see supra note 60, by focusing on 
the affirmative character of the Citizenship Clause of Section One. 
64.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the constitutional 
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude within the United States); id. amend. XIV, § 5 
(authorizing Congress to enforce Section One’s Citizenship Clause and guarantees of due process 
and equal protection); id. amend. XV, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the constitutional 
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting by states or the federal government). 
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interstate externalities are pervasive, so that any problem can be 
characterized as requiring collective action by two or more states—and 
therefore as justifying use of the Commerce Clause.  But if that is right, 
federalists may urge, then federal commerce power is limitless under a 
collective action approach, just as it is under the version of the substantial 
effects test that nationalists embrace. 
Turning to judicial review in particular, federalists may underscore 
certain considerations that may seem to render this conclusion inescapable.  
One is the tradition of judicial deference to acts of Congress.
65
  Another is 
the empirical uncertainty surrounding the significance of many interstate 
externalities and the adequacy of Congress’s response to them.66  If courts 
ask merely whether Congress had a rational basis to believe that federal 
regulation would ameliorate a multistate collective action problem, 
federalists might think, then deferential courts will always uphold federal 
legislation. 
Federalists may be inclined to scream “gotcha!” for a second reason.  In 
their view, the Commerce Clause does not justify federal power to solve any 
and all collective action problems.  Rather, this provision includes the word 
“Commerce,” which limits the kinds of problems “among the several 
States”67 that Congress may use the commerce power to address—namely, 
those problems that are “commercial” or “economic” in nature.  Moreover, 
some (though not all) federalists may insist that the Commerce Clause 
includes the word “regulate,”68 which further limits the kinds of problems 
that Congress may use the Clause to address—namely, those problems that 
involve preexisting “activity.”69  The joint dissent in NFIB appeared to voice 
these objections to a collective action approach.
70
  In response to Justice 
Ginsburg’s portrayal of the ACA as meaningfully addressing problems that 
 
65. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (Roberts, 
C.J.) (“Our permissive reading of these [enumerated] powers is explained in part by a general 
reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders.”); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 
1820 (2010) (“Respect for a coordinate branch of Government forbids striking down an Act of 
Congress except upon a clear showing of unconstitutionality.”); see also Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 752, 808 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s past record is one of . . . general deference to 
national [laws].”). 
66. Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 182 (“In order to establish the existence of a collective 
action problem among the states, does Congress need a plausible rationale, some evidence, or 
substantial evidence?”). 
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The power to 
regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”). 
70. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he decision to forgo 
participation in an interstate market is not itself commercial activity . . . .  [I]f every person comes 
within the Commerce Clause power . . . by the simple reason that he will one day engage in 
commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end.”). 
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the states cannot solve on their own, the dissent wrote that “Article I contains 
no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power.”71 
To my mind, the first criticism poses the most significant challenge to 
collective action approaches to the Commerce Clause.  Although one can 
define collective action problems broadly or narrowly,
72
 there is an 
entrenched presumption of constitutionality in enumerated powers litigation, 
one that goes back at least as far as McCulloch v. Maryland.
73
  This 
presumption has particular force on empirical questions in light of 
Congress’s superior fact-finding ability and democratic legitimacy to resolve 
empirical uncertainties.
74
  As long as the Court continues to respect the 
presumption of constitutionality,
75
 there will likely be greater cause for 
concern that collective action theory will remove judicially enforceable limits 
on the commerce power than that it will unduly limit the Commerce Clause.  
This may help to explain why a collective action approach has been 
embraced more by those who defend broad federal commerce power than by 
those who oppose it, and why it has been criticized more by those who 
oppose broad federal commerce power than by those who defend it.  I will 
consider each criticism in turn, although I will do so in reverse order for 
purposes of analytical clarity.  That is, I will first address the meaning of the 
word “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, and I will then address the 
meaning of the phrase “among the several States.”76 
A. First Objection: The Commerce Clause Says “Commerce” 
The first federalist criticism of a collective action approach to the 
Commerce Clause is that just because a problem is “among the several 
 
71. Id. at 2650.  My friend Randy Barnett has voiced a similar objection: 
Unless they voluntarily choose to engage in activity that is within Congress’s power to 
regulate or prohibit, the American people retain their sovereign power to refrain from 
entering into contracts with private parties, even when commandeering them to do so 
may be convenient to the regulation of commerce among the several states. 
Barnett, supra note 18, at 634. 
72. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 152–55, in which the authors suggest 
that the choice between broad and narrow definitions of interstate externalities may follow 
“predictable political lines.” 
73. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  For a good discussion of 
the presumption, see generally Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of 
Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1729–31 (2013). 
74. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 704 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[L]egislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from 
empirical fact.”). 
75. A majority of the Court respected the presumption to a significant extent in NFIB.  For a 
discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and 
Statesmanship, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 192–214 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). 
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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States” does not make it “Commerce.”77  The objection, in other words, is 
that the commerce power does not authorize Congress to address all 
multistate collective action problems.  Rather, it empowers Congress to 
ameliorate just those problems that involve “Commerce,” a term that the 
Lopez and Morrison Courts properly viewed as limited to “commercial” or 
“economic” interactions.78 
Federalists are right to point out that any plausible interpretation of the 
constitutional text must offer an account of the word “Commerce” in the 
Commerce Clause.
79
  A collective action approach is primarily a structural 
approach.  Structural approaches do not contradict the constitutional text.  
Rather, they give meaning to the text by explaining how various parts of the 
Constitution work, or should work, in practice.
80
 
 
77. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2650 (2012) (Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[The Constitution] enumerates not federally soluble 
problems, but federally available powers. . . .  Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-
national-problem power.”). 
78. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
one might define those terms. . . .  It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding 
regulations of activities that arise out of . . . a commercial transaction . . . .” (footnote omitted)); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (“Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case 
law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate 
activity . . . , the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” (citing Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559–60)). 
79. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101, 116 (2001) (“In none of the sixty-three appearances of the term ‘commerce’ in The 
Federalist Papers is it ever used to unambiguously refer to any activity beyond trade or 
exchange.”). 
80. Consider, for example, the theory of collective action federalism that I have articulated with 
Professor Cooter.  Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2.  Although the theory is consistent with the 
constitutional text, the theory is, first and foremost, neither textualist nor originalist nor 
consequentialist.  It is, rather, primarily an account of an important part of the American 
constitutional structure.  The theory seeks to interpret most of the clauses of Article I, Section 8 by 
drawing inferences from the relevant structures and relationships that the Constitution establishes—
namely, a federal system that presupposes the continued existence of the states and that endows the 
federal government with authority to solve problems that the states cannot address effectively on 
their own.  Using modern economics, collective action federalism pursues a consequentialist inquiry 
to identify the logic of such problems and to explain how federalism can ameliorate them. 
 Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, and the recorded 
statements of influential Framers matter to the theory because such materials provide important 
evidence of the federalist structure that was planned; they offer illuminating evidence of how an 
important component of the constitutional machine was supposed to function in practice.  The 
Federalist Papers, for example, are relevant to our structural account even though they had little 
impact on the ratification debate. 
 It might have turned out that this original plan for the proper interpretation of Section 8 ceased 
to make sense over time.  But that is not what happened regarding the distinction between 
individual and collective action by states; it continues to make good sense of this part of the 
American constitutional structure today, as modern economics helps to confirm.  Consequences 
matter to collective action federalism not because its structural account is instrumentalist all the way 
down, but because structural accounts are always in part consequentialist, regardless of how they 
are presented. 
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Federalists err, however, if they believe that collective action 
approaches read the word “Commerce” out of the Commerce Clause.  
Collective action theorists offer persuasive evidence that the Court’s 
“commercial” or “economic” interpretation of the word “Commerce” is not 
the best available interpretation.  For example, Professor Jack Balkin, who 
endorses a collective action approach to the commerce power, has disputed 
the Court’s “commercial” interpretation of the term “Commerce.”81  “In the 
eighteenth century,” he argues, “‘commerce’ did not have such narrowly 
economic connotations.  Instead, ‘commerce’ meant ‘intercourse’ and it had 
a strongly social connotation.  ‘Commerce’ was interaction and exchange 
between persons or peoples.”82 
Similarly, Professor Akhil Amar writes that the term “commerce” 
originally applied to more than economic interactions: it “also had in 1787, 
and retains even now, a broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse 
in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by 
explicit markets.” 83   Amar further argues that this broader reading of 
“Commerce” is structurally most sound: 
[It] would seem to make better sense of the [F]ramers’ general goals 
by enabling Congress to regulate all interactions (and altercations) 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes—interactions that, if improperly 
handled by a single state acting on its own, might lead to needless 
wars or otherwise compromise the interests of sister states.
84
 
In accord with the views of Balkin and Amar, the Marshall Court in Gibbons 
v. Ogden
85
 defined “Commerce” broadly as “intercourse,” and thus as 
including navigation.
86
 
My work with Professor Cooter has been agnostic about whether the 
Court and supportive commentators
87
 or Professors Balkin and Amar have 
 
81. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 15–18. 
82. Id. at 1; see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 138–82 (2011) (defining “com-
merce” as “intercourse”). 
83. AMAR, supra note 1, at 107. 
84. Id. 
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
86. Id. at 189–90.  Marshall reasoned: 
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.  It 
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its 
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.  The 
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which 
shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of 
the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing 
rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or 
of barter. 
Id. 
87. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 623, 649 (concluding that “[c]ommerce can mean a good deal more than trade—and the fact 
that it includes navigation is important evidence that it did—while meaning a good deal less than 
interaction”). 
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the better of this argument.
88
  In solo work, I have applied both the Court’s 
economic interpretation as a requirement of governing law, and a collective 
action approach as an interpretation and justification of pre-NFIB law.
89
  I 
have done so in order to establish that the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision is within the scope of the Commerce Clause even if one accepts the 
Court’s “economic” definition of “Commerce.”90  I am persuaded, however, 
that the Balkin–Amar interpretation of “Commerce,” while very broad, is 
also likely correct. 
For example, a quick Google search of “commerce definition” produces 
this initial set of definitions of the word “commerce”: 
Noun 
1.  The activity of buying and selling, esp. on a large scale. 
2.  Social dealings between people.
91
 
The first hit below these two definitions produces three definitions from the 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary: 
Definition of COMMERCE 
1: social intercourse : interchange of ideas, opinions, or sentiments 
2: the exchange or buying and selling of commodities on a large scale 
involving transportation from place to place 
3: sexual intercourse
92
 
 
Such definitions, and definitions like them in the Oxford English 
Dictionary,
93
 suggest that conceiving of “commerce” broadly—as 
encompassing social intercourse—is no great leap beyond the constitutional 
text.  And, of course, the sexual connotation of “intercourse” endures, which 
may explain why my less seasoned students giggle when I teach Gibbons. 
 
88. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2 (focusing on the distinction between individual 
and collective action by states, not on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct). 
89. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 17, at 594 (discussing four constitutional limits on the scope of 
the Commerce Clause, including a discussion of collective action limits and limits preventing 
congressional regulation of noneconomic conduct). 
90. See id. (concluding that the ACA’s minimum coverage provision respects several actual or 
potential constitutional limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause); Siegel, supra note 6, at 34 
(concluding that the minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it addresses economic 
problems of collective action facing the states). 
91. Commerce Definition, GOOGLE SEARCH, http://www.google.com (search for “commerce 
definition”). 
92. Commerce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commerce. 
93. See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “commerce” as, 
inter alia, (1) “Exchange between men of the products of nature or art; buying and selling together; 
trading; exchange of merchandise”; (2) “Intercourse in the affairs of life; dealings”; (3) “Intercourse 
of the sexes”; (4) “Interchange (esp. of letters, ideas, etc.)”; and (5) “Communication, means of free 
intercourse”). 
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True, the primary conception of “commerce” today focuses on market 
interactions.  Consider, for example, the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Department of Commerce.
94
  Even so, a change in principal meaning over 
time is no reason for courts to invalidate acts of Congress that meet the 
broader definition of “Commerce” but not the narrower one.  The primary 
meanings today of other terms of art in the Constitution—such as “Militia,”95 
“Magazines,” 96  “Misdemeanors,” 97  “Republican,” 98  “domestic Violence,” 99 
and “Reside”100—are also different from what they were at the time of the 
founding.  Their original meanings, however, continue to control 
interpretation of the Constitution.
101
 
Federalists on and off the Court will reject the Balkin–Amar 
interpretation of “Commerce.”  In addition to disputing the historical 
evidence, they may fear that the commerce power is limitless absent a narrow 
definition of “Commerce.”  But such fears are overstated.  The effect of the 
Balkin–Amar conception of commerce is not to remove all limits on the 
commerce power.  The effect, rather, is to move constitutional analysis away 
from the formal question of whether Congress is regulating a commercial 
problem to the functional question of whether Congress is regulating an 
interstate problem—that is, to whether commerce is “among the several 
States.”  This analytical move requires an analysis of collective action, which 
is a structurally more sensible place to look for limits on the Commerce 
Clause. 
Even as federalists reject the Balkin–Amar interpretation of 
“Commerce,” collective action reasoning may be informing their 
 
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006) (“It shall be the province and duty of [the Department of 
Commerce] to foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the mining, 
manufacturing, and fishery industries of the United States . . . .”). 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have Power . . .  To provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions . . . .”). 
96. Id. cl. 17 (“The Congress shall have Power . . .  To exercise . . . Authority . . . for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”).  This 
provision obviously does not refer to reading material. 
97. Id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).  See AMAR, supra note 1, at 222 (observing that 
“‘Misdemeanor’ in Article II was best read to mean misbehavior in a general sense as opposed to a 
certain kind of technical criminality”). 
98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).  This provision obviously does not refer to one of the two 
major political parties in the United States in modern times. 
99 . Id. (“The United States . . . shall protect each of [the States] . . . against domestic 
Violence.”).  This provision obviously does not refer to spousal abuse. 
100. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).  
Today, “reside” is often used in distinction from “domicile.” 
101. See BALKIN, supra note 82, at 37 (discussing the examples of “domestic Violence” and 
“Republican”). 
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determinations of whether the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate is 
economic in nature.  In other words, federalist Justices appear to answer the 
question of whether the conduct targeted by Congress is “economic” in 
nature by bundling in collective action logic.  It is not always obvious how to 
identify what the regulated conduct is, nor is it always obvious how to decide 
whether that conduct is economic.  Why, for instance, is personal use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant to state law “economic 
activity”?102  Why is growing wheat on one’s own land to feed one’s family 
and livestock “economic activity”?103  The Court upheld federal regulation of 
both under the Commerce Clause, ostensibly on the ground that they were 
part of a larger class of economic activity. 
Writing for a Court that included Justice Kennedy, in Gonzales v. Raich 
(the case about federal power to regulate medical marijuana use), Justice 
Stevens relied upon Wickard v. Filburn (the case about federal power to 
impose a wheat quota).  Stevens read Wickard as “establish[ing] that 
Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 
‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to 
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity.”104  The Court’s reasoning seemed to turn not on 
the inherently economic character of the general class of conduct subject to 
federal regulation, but on its interstate character.  Specifically, the Court 
seemed concerned about the collective action problems that would impede 
separate state regulation of the interstate wheat and marijuana markets.
105
  
The Court’s ostensibly formal conclusion about the nature of the regulated 
conduct may have resulted from an implicit collective action inquiry into the 
interstate scope of the problem.  If this interpretation is correct, then a 
collective action approach may be informing the reasoning of those who 
think they reject it.  A straightforward analysis of collective action problems 
would seem to be more transparent. 
Of course, even if federalists were right that a collective action approach 
was incapable of sufficiently limiting federal power or making sense of the 
word “Commerce” in the text, they would still need to defend their own 
 
102. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to regulate the personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant 
to state law authorizing such possession and use). 
103. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to regulate wheat grown for personal consumption or use). 
104. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
105. See, e.g., id. at 19.  The Court alluded to a collective action problem: 
[O]ne concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption in [the 
regulation reviewed in Wickard] was that rising market prices could draw such wheat 
into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices.  The parallel concern 
making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is 
the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana 
into that market. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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preferred constitutional limits against charges of arbitrariness.  As I have 
written elsewhere, whether or not the distinction between economic and 
noneconomic conduct explains when Congress is regulating “Commerce,” it 
does not explain when that commerce is “among the several States.” 106  
Federalists in essence assume that the regulated conduct is interstate in scope 
if it is commerce and intrastate in scope if it is not commerce.  That seems 
hard to defend formally or functionally.  Formally, the text suggests an 
Interstate Commerce Clause, not an Any Commerce Clause.  Functionally, 
the federal government is not necessarily better than the states at regulating 
economic problems, and the states are not necessarily better than the federal 
government at regulating noneconomic problems.  This is because economic 
matters may not implicate collective action problems for the states, and 
noneconomic matters may implicate collective action problems for the 
states.
107
 
What about the Court’s most recent Commerce Clause case, NFIB v. 
Sebelius?  The distinction five Justices drew between regulating and 
requiring commerce is even more difficult to defend as an independent limit 
on Congress.
108
  I have elsewhere examined the problems with this distinc-
tion from the standpoints of constitutional text, structure, history, precedent, 
and consequences.
109
  Here I will observe only that the distinction between 
prohibiting (or allowing) a purchase on the one hand, and requiring a 
purchase on the other—between regulating commerce and compelling 
commerce—has nothing to do with whether the regulated conduct is 
interstate or intrastate in scope.  If states may mandate private action when a 
commercial problem is intrastate in scope, then the federal government 
should be able to mandate private action when a commercial problem is 
interstate in scope.  Collective action theorists will therefore be inclined to 
reject the conclusion of five Justices in NFIB that the minimum coverage 
provision is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.
110
 
 
106. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 184 (“However adequate it may (or may not) be for 
purposes of defining ‘Commerce’ in Clause 3, the distinction between economic and noneconomic 
activity seems mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism; it does not explain when an activity 
exists ‘among the several States’ and when it exists within a state.”); Siegel, supra note 6, at 48 
(“Even if the economic–noneconomic categorization can suffice as a rough definition of 
‘Commerce,’ it cannot define when such commerce is ‘among the several States’ and when it is 
internal to one state.”). 
107. This point is stressed in Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 164. 
108. I offer no view here of whether this conclusion of five Justices is “holding” or “dicta.”  
The answer, it seems to me, turns on whether Chief Justice Roberts was entitled to apply the 
“classical” canon of constitutional avoidance instead of the “modern” canon.  For a discussion, see 
Siegel, supra note 75, at 198–200. 
109. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 41–54. 
110. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 
years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding.  There is no 
reason to depart from that understanding now.”); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (“[I]t must be activity affecting commerce that is regulated, and not merely the failure to 
2013] Collective Action Federalism  
 
 
That being said, the conclusion of these five Justices can be reconciled 
with a collective action approach.  A constitutional ban on using the 
commerce power to impose a purchase mandate rests on a narrow 
interpretation of the term “regulate” in the Commerce Clause.  Such a ban 
does not rest on an interpretation of the phrase “among the several States,” 
which is the language that collective action theory is best equipped to 
construe.  Accordingly, more than collective action logic is needed to 
persuasively reject the view that a purchase mandate is beyond the scope of 
the commerce power, just as more than collective action logic is needed to 
define the word “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause.111   To reject the 
conclusion of five Justices in NFIB, what is most needed is the 
straightforward observation that the term “regulation” has long been 
understood broadly in American constitutional law.  It has been understood 
to encompass prohibitions, permissions, and requirements.
112
 
B. Second Objection: The Commerce Clause Has Limits 
The upshot of the analysis so far is that the words “Commerce” and 
“regulate” in the Commerce Clause should be interpreted broadly.  There is, 
however, a potential problem with having the expanse and limits of the 
commerce power turn on an analysis of collective action problems “among 
the several states.”  In economics, an externality is an interdependence in the 
utility or production functions of different actors.
113
  Thus, an “interstate 
externality” is an interdependence in the utility or production functions of 
 
engage in commerce. . . .  Our test’s premise . . . rests upon the Constitution’s requirement that it be 
commerce which is regulated.  If all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is 
everything.”). 
111. Similarly, more than collective action logic is needed to persuasively reject the Court’s 
anticommandeering principle, another independent limit on the commerce power that the Court has 
imposed even when the federal law at issue was obviously directed at solving serious, multistate 
collective action problems.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) 
(invalidating provisions of a 1985 federal law that required states either to take title to low-level 
radioactive waste produced within their borders or else to pass certain regulations governing 
disposal of the waste, on the ground that both options involved unconstitutional commandeering of 
the states’ legislative and administrative apparatuses).  New York and Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997), which also enforced the anticommandeering principle, are nonetheless 
reconcilable with collective action approaches to the Commerce Clause because such approaches do 
not reject all other independent limits on congressional power. 
112. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  Judge Silberman wrote: 
At the time the Constitution was fashioned, to “regulate” meant, as it does now, “[t]o 
adjust by rule or method,” as well as “[t]o direct.”
  
To “direct,” in turn, included “[t]o 
prescribe certain measure[s]; to mark out a certain course,” and “[t]o order; to 
command.”  In other words, to “regulate” can mean to require action, and nothing in 
the definition appears to limit that power only to those already active in relation to an 
interstate market.  Nor was the term “commerce” limited to only existing commerce. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
113. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153 n.143 (“An interstate externality refers to 
interdependence in the utility functions of individuals in at least two states.”). 
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actors in different states.
114
  This interdependence may take one of two basic 
forms.  First, it may involve the imposition of material costs or benefits 
without paying for them (material externalities).
115
  An example is pollution 
in State A that migrates and harms the physical health of residents of State B.  
Second, this interdependence may involve the imposition of psychological 
costs or benefits without paying for them (psychological externalities).
116
  An 
example is pollution in State A that stays put but causes residents of State B 
to object on moral grounds that private industry in State A is harming the 
health of residents of State A. 
Interstate externalities in this technical sense are pervasive, particularly 
if one broadens the time horizon.  In Lopez, to reiterate, Justice Breyer was 
right that guns in schools impact violence in schools, and that violence in 
schools eventually impacts national economic performance, so that the ways 
in which states regulate (or do not regulate) guns in schools (eventually) have 
external effects in other states.
117
  Accordingly, an approach to the Com-
merce Clause that turns exclusively on the existence of any sort of interstate 
externality risks blowing up the idea of a national government of limited, 
enumerated powers.
118
 
To avoid this consequence, a collective action approach has two 
primary options.  First, it can enforce collective action limits indirectly 
through legal doctrine that employs a conceptually imperfect but relatively 
determinate proxy for multistate collective action problems.
119
  I will call this 
the “indirect approach.”  Alternatively, a collective action approach can 
enforce collective action limits directly by limiting the kinds of interstate 
externalities that justify Commerce Clause legislation.  I will call this the 
“direct approach.” 
1. The Indirect Approach.—One could commend a proxy approach to 
the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, one could attempt to justify the contemporary 
Court’s distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” conduct in just 
this way.
120
  The Court’s economic–noneconomic distinction may be de-
 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 152, 153 n.143, 172–73. 
116. Id. at 152–53. 
117. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
118. I also referenced Justice Breyer’s Lopez dissent in critiquing the substantial effects test, 
but this does not imply that the substantial effects test is the same as a test that turns on interstate 
externalities.  While substantial effects on interstate commerce are potential evidence of interstate 
spillover effects, the two kinds of effects are conceptually distinct.  Externalities are limited to 
effects that are external to the market.  They are external to the market because they are unpriced.  
The Court’s current doctrine is thus overinclusive. 
119. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
(distinguishing questions of constitutional meaning from the formulation of implementing 
doctrines). 
120. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs 
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 159 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s attention to where the causal 
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fended as roughly correlated with the existence or nonexistence of collective 
action problems involving multiple states, even if some (or much) economic 
conduct does not cause collective action problems involving multiple states, 
and even if some (or much) noneconomic conduct does cause such 
problems.
121
 
I am skeptical of such an approach for two reasons.  First, as noted in 
the previous section, the question of whether something is “Commerce” may 
not have much to do with whether it is “among the several States.”  This is 
because economic conduct does not characteristically cause collective action 
problems for the states, and noneconomic conduct is not characteristically 
free of collective action problems.  Accordingly, Congress is not generally 
better than the states at regulating “economic” problems, and the states are 
not generally better than Congress at regulating “noneconomic” problems. 
Second, the costs of a relatively poor proxy may be particularly high in 
this setting because the Commerce Clause licenses federal coercion of 
individuals.  To the extent that constitutional federalism distributes 
regulatory power vertically in part to prevent unjustified federal interference 
with individual liberty (a point of emphasis among opponents of the 
ACA),
122
 it follows that the costs of commerce power regulations that do not 
solve multistate collective action problems may be particularly high.  To 
illustrate the potential coerciveness of commerce power regulations, the 
Commerce Clause may usefully be contrasted with the Taxing Clause.
123
 
Professor Cooter and I have developed an effects theory of the tax 
power, according to which there is a substantive, anticoercion limit on the 
scope of the Taxing Clause.
124
  Whereas taxes characteristically dampen the 
conduct subject to the exaction, penalties characteristically prevent the 
conduct.
125
  It is just because taxes dampen conduct without preventing it that 
taxes raise revenue.  If the exaction is relatively modest in amount and thus is 
a tax, many individuals subject to it reasonably can opt out of federal 
regulation by paying the tax.  By contrast, if the exaction is very high in 
amount and thus is a penalty, almost everyone subject to it has no reasonable 
choice but to engage in the congressionally favored conduct.  The exaction 
may be as coercive as congressional use of the Commerce Clause.
126
  The 
 
chain starts—i.e., with whether the regulated activity is itself ‘commercial’ or ‘non-commercial’—
seems to stem from the Court’s reluctance to attempt to draw lines at any later point in the chain of 
economic interactions.”). 
121. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 164. 
122. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism . . . protects 
the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated 
governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.”). 
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
124. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects 
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012). 
125. Id. at 1229–30. 
126. For greater specification of what it means for a federal exaction to be relatively modest or 
very high in amount, see generally id.  The key distinction is between dampening conduct and 
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Court’s tax power analysis in NFIB tracks the effects theory almost 
exactly.
127
 
Professor Cooter and I have written elsewhere that the tax–penalty 
distinction helps to preserve limits on the Commerce Clause.
128
  The 
distinction stops Congress from taking a regulation backed by a penalty that 
is beyond the scope of the commerce power, relabeling the penalty a tax, and 
imposing it under the Taxing Clause.  I have just shown something else—that 
the tax–penalty distinction helps to preserve limits on the Taxing Clause 
itself.  Congress must always respect the particular constitutional constraints 
on use of a given enumerated power, not all of which concern the existence 
or absence of a collective action problem.
129
  The tax–penalty distinction 
ensures that Congress uses the tax power only in ways that are consistent 
with revenue raising.  Congress need not intend to raise revenue as a primary 
objective in order to rely on the tax power—from the very beginning, 
Congress has used the tax power for both revenue-raising and regulatory 
purposes.
130
  But congressional exercise of this power must result in revenue 
raising.
131
  The tax–penalty distinction guarantees that it will.132 
In contrast to the Taxing Clause, there is no substantive anticoercion 
limit on the scope of the commerce power.
133
  Not only may Congress 
require people to pay very large sums of money for violating valid 
Commerce Clause regulations, but it may also prosecute violators 
criminally.
134
  Accordingly, the harm to the constitutional structure is likely 
to be greater when the judiciary allows Congress to regulate intrastate 
commerce than when it allows Congress to tax for intrastate regulatory 
purposes.  Instead of using a relatively unreliable proxy for problems that are 
 
preventing conduct.  To make this determination, we counsel looking primarily to the material 
characteristics of the exaction: whether it is high relative to the benefit of almost everyone from 
engaging in the assessed conduct, and whether the amount one must pay increases with 
intentionality and repetition.  Secondarily, we advise looking to the expressive form of the exaction.  
See generally id. 
127. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword: Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1189, 1190–91 (2012). 
128. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 124. 
129. In other words, Section 8 as a whole gives Congress the tools it requires to solve all 
multistate collective action problems.  But each enumerated power in Section 8 does not give 
Congress the power to address every conceivable collective action problem facing the states. 
130. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 124, at 1204–10 (providing examples from different eras 
of American history). 
131. See id. at 1224. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
133. There is also an anticoercion limit on the scope of the spending power, which I explore 
elsewhere.  See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy or Dragoon: 
Unity in Taxing and Spending Under the General Welfare Clause (May 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
134. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding a criminal provision of the 
Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause). 
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interstate in scope, a collective action approach should find ways to limit the 
kinds of interstate externalities that justify Commerce Clause legislation. 
2. The Direct Approach.—There is no neutral or objective way to limit 
the kinds of interstate externalities that are admissible in a collective action 
analysis of the Commerce Clause.  For example, people disagree in 
ideologically predictable ways about whether interstate public goods are few 
or many in number.
135
  They also disagree about whether interstate markets 
are largely self-regulating.
136
  Even so, resources are available that have the 
potential to attract broad support.  I will note three of them. 
First, courts should rule out psychological externalities as justifying use 
of the commerce power.
137
  To be sure, psychological externalities can be 
real and pervasive in a country in which most citizens self-identify as 
Americans, particularly after a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other 
cataclysmic event.
138
  Americans care about whether other Americans live or 
die, have clean air and water, have access to food and shelter, etc.  On the 
more meddlesome side, Americans may also care about what other 
Americans read, watch, and do in their free time.  Professor Amartya Sen 
used as an example the preferences of two people, one a “prude” and one not, 
regarding whether the other should read a book that the prude deems obscene 
and the non-prude deems good literature.
139
  It is apt to describe such 
psychological externalities as busybody preferences. 
Regardless of whether particular psychological externalities are 
normatively attractive, allowing them to justify federal power risks 
vindicating the federalist objection that a collective action approach confers 
unlimited congressional authority.  Professor Sen’s point was that negative 
psychological externalities pose a threat to individualism in economic theory 
by making Pareto improvements impossible.
140
  In the face of such 
externalities, every deviation from the status quo that would make one party 
better off would necessarily make some other party worse off.
141
  Similarly, 
 
135. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 152. 
136. For a discussion, see id. at 152–53. 
137. Balkin, supra note 6, at 44; see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153–54 (reserving 
judgment on this question). 
138. See, e.g., Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 404–
06 (2005) (recounting instances in American history where public support for humanitarian relief 
initiatives was used in arguments countering constitutional objections to the proposed measures). 
139. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 155 (1970).  
The book that Professor Sen used in his example is Lady Chatterly’s Lover by D.H. Lawrence.  Id. 
140. Specifically, Professor Sen demonstrated that preferences about other people’s preferences 
(second-order preferences) undermine the utility of Pareto efficiency as a normative criterion.  See 
id. at 157 n.6 (“The difficulties of achieving Pareto optimality in the presence of externalities are 
well known.  What is at issue here is the acceptability of Pareto optimality as an objective in the 
context of liberal values, given certain types of externalities.”). 
141. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153 & n.144. 
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psychological externalities pose a threat to state regulatory autonomy in 
constitutional theory by potentially justifying unlimited federal power. 
The tradition of cost–benefit analysis in economics neither categorically 
excludes nor categorically includes psychological externalities.  Rather, 
economists have tended to handle the issue of psychological externalities by 
crediting such externalities only if there is a demonstrated willingness to pay 
to vindicate one’s moral concerns.  Cheap talk does not suffice.142  This 
intellectual tradition can be deployed to help justify the contemporary 
Court’s deference to Congress regarding whether particular federal 
expenditures promote the general welfare,
143
 but it does not justify admitting 
psychological externalities into a collective action analysis of the Commerce 
Clause. 
In conditional spending cases, Congress conditions federal funds to the 
states or private entities on the agreement by recipients to act in ways that 
Congress cannot simply require.  In South Dakota v. Dole,
144
 for example, 
the Court upheld a federal law that conditioned five percent of federal 
highway funds on the agreement by recipient states to impose a 21-year-old 
drinking age.
145
  By using the conditional spending power in this and other 
ways, Congress may be able to achieve regulatory objectives that it may not 
otherwise be able to achieve.
146
  The Dole Court, for instance, assumed for 
purposes of analysis that the Twenty-First Amendment would prohibit 
Congress from imposing a national drinking age directly.
147
 
Significantly, however, Congress’s efforts to achieve regulatory 
objectives through use of the conditional spending power are not cost free.  
On the contrary, Congress is paying to vindicate whatever regulatory 
concerns it has.
148
  Accordingly, psychological externalities may be available 
to justify much conditional spending.  If psychological externalities are 
admissible, then the highway deaths on intrastate roads caused when young 
adults drink and drive may impact the general welfare.  If only material 
 
142. For a discussion, see id. at 153. 
143. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (“The level of deference to 
the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general 
welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 
(1976) (per curiam))). 
144. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
145. Id. at 211–12. The Dole Court identified four constitutional limits on conditional federal 
spending: (1) the spending must be for the general welfare; (2) the condition must be clearly stated; 
(3) the condition must be related to the purpose(s) of the federal spending program; and (4) the 
condition must not violate an independent constitutional limit.  Id. at 207–08. 
146. Id. at 207 (“Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative 
fields[]’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional 
grant of federal funds.” (citation omitted)). 
147. Id. at 206. 
148. See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 883 n.34 (2008) 
(arguing that while the Spending Clause “might allow Congress to enact legislation that would go 
beyond the limits of its other main sources of authority,” still “Congress must literally pay a price, 
both in treasury dollars and political capital, for such expansions”). 
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externalities are admissible, then the problem of highway deaths on intrastate 
roads is more likely to be local in nature. 
The propriety of taking psychological externalities into account when 
Congress is willing to pay is one way to understand the longstanding judicial 
practice of deferring completely to congressional determinations of whether 
particular federal expenditures promote the “general Welfare.” 149   In 
principle, welfare is “general” (in the language of the General Welfare 
Clause) when and only when commerce is “among the several States” (in the 
language of the Commerce Clause).
150
  Specifically, welfare is “general” or 
“among the several States” when the federal government can obtain it and 
the separate states cannot—that is, when spillovers pose a collective action 
problem for the states.  Both bits of constitutional language reference a 
problem of collective action involving at least two states. 
In practice, however, Congress’s need to pay to advance the general 
welfare only in conditional spending power cases may justify a less 
demanding judicial inquiry into the interstate scope of the regulatory 
problem.  The need for Congress to pay helps to ensure that it is not engaging 
in cheap talk and thus sensibly limits its use of the Spending Clause.
151
  
Allowing Congress to spend based on psychological externalities, whose 
existence and scope may change over time, also helps to make sense of 
Justice Cardozo’s statement for the Court that the concept of the general 
welfare is not “static.”152  “Needs that were narrow or parochial a century 
ago,” he wrote, “may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the 
Nation.”153 
To be sure, when Congress demonstrates its willingness to pay, it is not 
the same as when an individual demonstrates such willingness.  Not only is 
Congress spending other people’s money, but it can also raise taxes to 
support more spending, and it can deficit spend.  Even so, Congress’s ability 
to keep spending is limited; it is not cost free for Congress to work its will 
through the spending power.  Indeed, anticommandeering doctrine perceives 
a constitutionally significant difference between simply requiring states to 
regulate on Congress’s behalf and offering states money if they agree to 
 
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
150. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 119. 
151. The Dole Court, at the end of its opinion, mentioned that a “financial inducement offered 
by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”  
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).  But the 
Court upheld the drinking-age condition on the ground that Congress was offering only “relatively 
mild encouragement to the States.”  Id.  Twenty-five years later, in NFIB, the Court held for the first 
time that a condition attached to a federal funding program was unconstitutionally coercive, with 
the Justices fracturing three ways on whether or why the condition was coercive.  Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608, 2641–42, 2662–66 (2012).  For a theory of coercion 
in conditional spending cases that seeks to bring some clarity to this newly important constitutional 
question, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 133. 
152. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937). 
153. Id. 
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regulate on Congress’s behalf. 154   Only the latter alternative requires 
Congress to internalize at least some of the costs of its regulatory 
objectives.
155
  This cost-internalization rationale for the anticommandeering 
principle is stronger than the Court’s strained analysis of political 
accountability.
156
 
The Commerce Clause is different from the conditional spending power 
on the key question of whether Congress has demonstrated a willingness to 
pay.  When resting on the Commerce Clause, Congress need not demonstrate 
any willingness to pay to vindicate the psychological concerns of people in 
one state for the welfare of people in other states.
157
  Congress need simply 
impose the requirement.  Limiting a collective action analysis to material 
externalities avoids the unboundedness of an inquiry into nonmaterial 
externalities—into preferences about other people’s preferences—when there 
is no requirement to pay. 
In addition to ruling out psychological externalities as justifying use of 
the commerce power, there is a second way to limit the kinds of interstate 
externalities that count in a collective action analysis of the Commerce 
Clause.  Judicial review should turn not just on the existence of an interstate 
externality, but also on its significance and on the extent to which the federal 
law at issue meaningfully addresses it.  Consider, for example, the regulated 
conduct in Lopez—firearm possession in a school zone.158  The way that one 
state regulates this problem does not appear to undermine how other states 
regulate this problem, and the external effect of guns in schools on national 
productivity is attenuated and long-term.  The externality seems relatively 
 
154. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“Our cases have identi-
fied a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a 
legislative program consistent with federal interests.”). 
155. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2006).  In this article, I identify a cost-internalization rationale for the 
anticommandeering principle: 
Anticommandeering doctrine vindicates federalism values
 
. . . to the extent 
that it forces the federal government to internalize more of the financial and 
accountability costs associated with regulating. 
 
As law and economics posits, 
actors that do not internalize the full costs of their behavior tend to engage in 
too much of the behavior. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
156. See id. at 1632.  I question the Court’s accountability rationale for anticommandeering 
doctrine: 
Even after factoring in search costs and rational ignorance, it seems likely that 
citizens who pay attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able 
to discern which level of government is responsible for a government 
regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may be largely beyond 
judicial or political help on the accountability front. 
Id. 
157. Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153–54 (asking whether “the standard of ‘willingness 
to pay’ [could] achieve the same success in constitutional law [as in cost–benefit analysis] by 
limiting the feelings that count as interstate externalities”). 
158. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
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insignificant.  Moreover, in light of the forty-plus state criminal laws already 
on the books, the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA)
159
 did not appear to 
meaningfully address the problem.
160
  Justice Kennedy was almost certainly 
right that the regulatory power of the states was “sufficient” to address it.161  
For the most part, the GFSZA seemed to be symbolic grandstanding by the 
federal government. 
Third, courts should impose a reasonableness inquiry in the context of 
judicial review, in contrast to genuine rational basis review.  Questions of 
significance and meaningfulness are matters of judgment.  Reasonable 
people will often disagree about them.  When reasonable people could differ 
about the significance of a multistate collective action problem and about the 
adequacy of Congress’s response, courts should uphold federal legislation in 
light of the aforementioned presumption of constitutionality and the tradition 
of judicial deference to Congress in federalism cases.
162
 
A reasonableness inquiry, however, is not the same thing as genuine 
rational basis review.  Under a rational basis test, even Lopez may be 
justifiable on collective action grounds.  By contrast, a reasonableness 
inquiry should require both a plausible theoretical rationale that a significant, 
multistate collective action problem exists, and some empirical evidence to 
support that rationale.
163
  The stronger the theoretical rationale, the less 
evidence should be required.  And the less plausible the theoretical rationale, 
the more evidence should be required. 
For example, contrast the GFSZA with the ban on racial discrimination 
in public accommodations imposed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
164
  As 
explained in Part I, it was at least reasonable to view the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 as meaningfully addressing significant collective action problems 
involving multiple states in light of the various ways in which Jim Crow laws 
and policies in the South impeded the interstate travel of African-Americans 
to Southern states on a temporary basis; distorted the allocation of labor and 
capital from other parts of the nation; and encouraged the Great Migration of 
African-Americans in the South to cities in the North.
165
  By maintaining 
racial segregation, Southern states were imposing significant, material costs 
on the rest of the nation. 
 
159. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006)). 
160. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Indeed, over 40 States al-
ready have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.”). 
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Key provisions of the Affordable Care Act are also reasonably viewed 
as meaningfully contributing to the solution of significant collective action 
problems in light of the mobility or immobility of various participants in 
health care and health insurance markets, including insurers, hospitals, 
employers, healthy individuals, and unhealthy individuals.
166
  For example, 
the minimum coverage provision is reasonably viewed as combating cost 
shifting from the uninsured to other participants in health care markets.
167
  
This cost shifting is likely interstate in scope because of the presence of 
“insurance companies in multiple states and the phenomenon of cross-state 
hospital use.”168  Consider as well the ACA provisions that prohibit insurance 
companies from denying people coverage based on preexisting conditions 
and discriminating against them based on their medical histories.
169
  These 
provisions very likely solve collective action problems for the states by 
facilitating labor mobility, discouraging the flight of insurance companies 
from states that guarantee access to states that do not, and discouraging states 
from free riding on the more generous health care systems of other states.
170
 
In sum, the foregoing federalist objection to a collective action account 
of the Commerce Clause warrants serious consideration.  The objection 
appropriately instructs collective action theorists either to defend a good 
proxy to a collective action analysis, or to limit the universe of interstate 
externalities that count as multistate collective action problems justifying 
federal commerce power.  Fortunately, resources are available to accomplish 
the latter task in the context of judicial review.  The decisive question in 
Commerce Clause cases should be whether Congress had a reasonable basis 
to believe that it was meaningfully addressing a significant, material 
interstate externality.  To support an affirmative answer, a reviewing court 
could require Congress to proffer both a theoretical rationale and empirical 
evidence. 
To be sure, these resources are not fully determinate; they require 
contestable judgment calls.  But the same is true of any approach to the 
commerce power that places at least some limits on federal power.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist thus conceded in Lopez that “a determination whether an 
intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result 
in legal uncertainty.”171  Echoing Chief Justice Marshall, however, he added 
that “so long as Congress’[s] authority is limited to those powers enumerated 
in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted 
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as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under 
the Commerce Clause always will engender legal uncertainty.”172 
Conclusion 
Nationalists and federalists alike may be inclined to reject collective 
action approaches to the Commerce Clause.  Collective action theory seeks a 
path between a regime of no judicially enforceable limits on the commerce 
power and a regime of structurally arbitrary limits on the commerce power.  
If one does not believe in judicial review of federalism questions, then one 
should reject collective action approaches, or else should understand them as 
directed at conscientious legislators, presidents, and citizens.  If one does 
believe in judicial review of federalism questions, and if one believes that 
only relatively clear rules can meaningfully limit federal power, then one 
should also reject collective action theory. 
I have argued, however, that nationalists and federalists have more 
reason to accept collective action theory than they may think.  A collective 
action approach justifies substantially more federal power than nationalists 
may fear, particularly in light of material interstate externalities and the 
presumption of constitutionality in the context of judicial review.  A 
collective action approach would also impose some structurally sensible 
limits on the Commerce Clause, thereby speaking to the constitutional 
commitments of federalists.  Collective action approaches largely 
legitimate—and integrate different decades of—the constitutional regime in 
which Americans have been living since 1937.  Both nationalists and 
federalists have played major roles in the construction of this regime. 
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